




Lifetime Employment in Japan:  Concepts and Measurements 
 










This paper poses three fundamental questions about lifetime employment in Japan:  How big is it?  How unique 
is it? And, how is it changing?  I examine different concepts and methods for estimating lifetime employment 
and conclude that it covers roughly 20 percent of the Japanese labor force.  Job mobility remains considerably 
lower in Japan than in other economies (particularly the U.S.).  Evidence regarding changes in lifetime 
employment is mixed.  The share of workers in the core, an ex-ante measure of lifetime employment, is 
declining.  But the probability of job separations has remained stable for those who are already in the system.  I 
also find evidence that the incentives among workers, managers and executives are aligned to preserve the 
lifetime employment system. 
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  This paper poses three fundamental questions about lifetime employment in Japan:  
How big is it?  How unique is it?  And, how is it changing?  The first question concerns the 
lifetime employment rate, which refers to the proportion of the labor force that is covered by 
lifetime employment.  Despite significant advances and contributions in all possible areas of 
lifetime employment, hard data regarding its actual size is rarely reported.  The question – 
how big is lifetime employment? – is perhaps one of the most frequently posed questions in 
empirical research, and yet few researchers have seriously undertaken the effort to estimate its 
size with precision.  Informed scholars are aware that its actual coverage is limited to a 
minority share of the Japanese labor force.  As Ohtake (2001) explains, “if one assumes that 
all employees of Japanese corporations are hired under the lifetime employment system, then 
such a person has seriously misconstrued the Japanese employment system” (p.29).  Some 
point to 30 percent or one-third (Form 1979; Hashimoto and Raisian 1985; Schregle 1993), 
but one-third of what?  What is the denominator, and what is the numerator?  The confusion 
stems from the lack of consensus concerning the definition of lifetime employment, of which 
discussions become quickly confounded in conflicting or overlapping concepts. 
  The implicit nature of lifetime employment is the root of the problem in 
measurement, as there is no unified survey method to estimate its size.  Lifetime employment 
is not a contractual state (Itoh 1991).  The employment contract includes no explicit clause 
regarding this policy, and employers are under no obligation to guarantee employment.  
Lifetime employment is thus better understood as a long-term commitment between workers 
and employers rather than a permanent employment contract.  As such, a worker survey 
cannot ask the question, “Are you covered by lifetime employment?”  Likewise, an employer 
survey cannot ask the question, “What proportion of your workforce is covered by lifetime   2
employment?”  And even if such questions could be posed, there would be considerable 
discretion in their interpretations which would result in severe measurement bias.
1   
  An accurate assessment of lifetime employment invariably requires the time 
dimension.  Information concerning past job histories are required to examine patterns of 
labor market mobility.  But such microdata are not readily available in Japan.  Large scale 
employment surveys conducted by the central government ministries are not available as 
microdata, but only as published statistics.  Longitudinal data, by either government or private 
organizations, are non-existent.
2  As such, measuring lifetime employment in Japan requires 
simplifications and approximations from which we may deduce its size and speculate its 
direction of change.  I review the existing literature and outline the various methods used to 
estimate the size of lifetime employment, and present the latest available measures. 
  While estimations of lifetime employment provide a better understanding of the 
“facts,” their utility will be limited unless we know how the facts compare to other economies.  
The second question therefore assesses the uniqueness of Japan’s long-term employment in an 
international context.  Long-term employment is observed in other industrialized economies, 
so why the exclusive focus on Japan?  Is there a pattern that is unique to Japan?  One of the 
problems underlying comparative research on employment durations is the lack of 
comparable data.  Consequently, much of the existing research relies on U.S.-Japan 
comparisons.  However, these two countries represent two extremes, so the findings 
                                                 
1 Some researchers claim that a precise measurement of lifetime employment is not possible because there are 
too many gray areas regarding its coverage and application (Abegglen and Stalk 1985; Schregle 1979).  Cole 
(1979) explains that workers will only be confused when they are asked whether they are covered by lifetime 
employment.  Some employer surveys may directly pose the question about lifetime employment coverage, but 
this method is questionable.  For example, the following is an excerpt from an employer survey administered by 
the Center for Public Resources Development (2003):  “We assume that all workers employed by your 
organization are covered by lifetime employment.  If lifetime employment only applies to your regular workers, 
then please indicate the proportion covered by lifetime employment to be the proportion of regular workers 
employed by your organization.  If lifetime employment does not necessarily apply to your regular workers, then 
please provide us with your own definition of lifetime employment, and the proportion covered in your 
organization under this definition.” 
2 Panel data from the Institute for Research on Household Economics is available on request.  But the first wave 
was conducted in 1993, and the sample (N=1,500) consists only of women.   3
unanimously show support for long-term employment in Japan when compared to the U.S.  
My comparative analysis will likewise be constrained by data, but I nevertheless attempt to 
evaluate the uniqueness of lifetime employment in Japan relative to the U.S. and other 
countries. 
  The third question here looks at changes in the lifetime employment practice over 
time.  This area has received the most attention, perhaps more so in policy and the media than 
in the academic community.  The debate over the demise of lifetime employment is hardly 
new.  It is a recurring theme which has evolved over the postwar period in response to 
fluctuations in the business cycle, not only during the slump years but also during the growth 
years (Moriguchi and Ono, forthcoming; Ono 1997).  Most recently, the debate focuses on the 
lost decade of the 1990s and its impact on the lifetime employment system.  If we take the 
journalistic coverage at face value, then all signs point to the end of lifetime employment in 
Japan.  But on what basis can we claim its demise?  Changes in lifetime employment really 
depend on how one defines it, which puts more emphasis on my first question.  Indeed, for 
every scholarly article written about the demise of lifetime employment, there is another 
which indicates its stability and resilience. 
  Paralleling this debate in Japan, a panel of experts examined trends in job stability 
and job security in the U.S., primarily in response to the wake of journalistic and anecdotal 
accounts suggesting the end of lifetime jobs in the U.S. in the 1990s.  Their collective efforts 
(published in the special issue, “Changes in Job Stability and Job Security,” Journal of Labor 
Economics [1999], and also in edited volume by Neumark 2000) found some evidence of 
declining job stability in the 1990s, but they conclude that these changes were not 
overwhelmingly large, and have not persisted long enough to constitute a widespread shift in 
the U.S. labor market.   4
  The absence of large, high-quality datasets, such as are available in the U.S., make it 
difficult to carry out a comprehensive and systematic evaluation of the state of employment 
stability in Japan.  However, we can track and monitor the movements, as long as we define 
the concepts and measurements of lifetime employment with consistency and clarity.  By 
some accounts, my analysis may lead to seemingly conflicting findings.  The final section of 
the paper attempts to make sense of these in a consistent framework. 
  Owing to the keen interest in the academic community, there is now a rich and 
extensive collection of theoretical and empirical literature covering all possible aspects of 
lifetime employment in Japan, but very little discussing its actual size.  Instead of adding to 
this existing literature, my main contribution is to provide an accurate measurement of the 
size of lifetime employment.   
  I also contribute to the literature by highlighting gender differences in lifetime 
employment.  It is often argued that lifetime employment is gender biased by design (Ono, 
forthcoming).  The system favors men who are able to make long-term commitments, but 
disfavors women who are not in a position to do so because they are expected take on family 
obligations.  However, it is hasty to assume that women are automatically excluded from 
coverage, which is more often than not the underlying assumption in much of the earlier 
studies.  I examine the data for both men and women, and assess the extent of gender 
asymmetries in the lifetime employment system. 
 
2.  Concepts and measurements of lifetime employment:  Review of the literature 
  Previous literature on lifetime employment points to two broad categories of 
measurement and its applications – the labor market segmentation (or ex-ante) method and the 
ex-post method.  Their main contributions are outlined in Table 1 in chronological order of 
their citations.     5
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Labor market segmentation (ex-ante) method 
  The labor market segmentation method partitions the labor market into specified 
segments, and presupposes that certain employers are in the position to offer lifetime 
employment, while others are not.  Workers who are covered by lifetime employment 
constitute the “core” workforce, to distinguish them from the “periphery” workforce.  The 
lifetime employment rate is thus equal to the size of the core workforce divided by the total 
size of the labor force. 
  The segmentation method is a static, ex-ante view of the labor market which rests on 
some rather strong assumptions.  It implicitly assumes that employers offer lifetime 
employment as a benefit by protecting their core workers from fluctuations in labor demand 
and the ensuing threat of dismissals.  The likelihood of offering lifetime protection to their 
employees is directly related to the size of the employer.  The exclusion of small and medium 
enterprises from the estimations presupposes that SME’s are not in the position to offer these 
benefits. 
  The segmentation method is rooted in the persistence of the dual labor market 
structure in Japan where firm size is the line that separates the primary from the secondary 
labor market (Ishikawa and Dejima 1994).
3  Comparative studies have found that labor 
market demarcation in Japan is more pronounced along lines of firm size rather than along 
different product markets and industries (Bronfenbrenner and Yasuba 1987; Rebick 1993; 
Tachibanaki and Ohta 1994).  Larger firms offer greater benefits – both monetary and non-
                                                 
3 The dual labor market structure overlaps with the concept of the internal labor market.  For example, Koike 
(1977) writes that the long-term employment relationship found in large firms in Japan is comparable to the 
conditions of internal labor markets found elsewhere.  Ariga et al (2000) argues that firm size is a useful but an 
incomplete measure of an internal labor market.  The latter is multi-dimensional and determined by the 
distribution of firm size, industry, and occupations.   6
monetary – and the magnitude of this firm-size effect in Japan has been found to be stronger 
than those reported in other countries.
4
  Previous research using this method has evolved over time by imposing additional 
conditions to the definitions of core workers established by their predecessors (see Table 1).  
Taira (1962) suggests that lifetime employment applies to regular employees in unionized 
establishments of more than 500 persons.  Dore (1973) adds to Taira’s definition by including 
government sector employees.  Cole (1979), in response to Dore, explains that women are 
rarely covered by lifetime employment, and revises Dore’s estimates downward.
5  Abegglen 
and Stalk (1985) argue that lifetime employment is not coterminous with unionization.  The 
Ministry of Labor (1993) sets forth their definition by delineating the lifetime workforce as 
male regular workers in government, and in the non-agricultural sector in firms ≥ 500. 
  The utility of the labor market segmentation method is utmost in its convenience and 
ease of calculation.  Tabulations of the labor force by establishment size and other attributes 
are widely available from various government statistics.  Estimating the lifetime employment 
rate thus does not require access to microdata; it is simply an exercise in counting the labor 
force.  The method is also useful because it allows consistent comparisons over time. 
  But there are obvious drawbacks to the segmentation method.  First, it is a static, 
snapshot view of the labor market which ignores the time dimension of lifetime employment.  
To assume that all employees are hired for life in large establishments, but none are among 
SME’s is highly problematic.  Second, the dividing line that separates large establishments 
from SME’s is arbitrary.  Using establishment size of 500 as the dividing line is a matter of 
convention, and there is no theoretical or empirical justification for its application.  Third, it 
rests crucially on the assumption of the dual labor market structure in Japan.  Applying this 
                                                 
4 For example, Rebick (1993) finds that the difference in logged average hourly earnings between large (more 
than 1000) and small firms (less than 100) in Japan was .54 compared to .28 in the U.S. 
5 This point is also emphasized by Form (1979) who explains Japan’s dual labor market structure as follows:  
“One market offers lifetime security to a minority of men working in large corporations; but the major free 
market exposes women, the poorly educated, and the aged to the vicissitudes of freedom” (p.13).   7
method in an international context is impractical, because segmentation by firm size is less 
pronounced in other countries.  And fourth, the automatic exclusion of female workers from 
the lifetime employment system is outdated.  As it stands, the segmentation method cannot 
estimate the share of women employed under lifetime employment.  Women may have been 
systematically excluded from lifetime employment in the past, but they have made significant 




  The ex-post method views lifetime employment as a behavioral outcome of surviving 
job separations at specified durations of employment.  It is closer to the intuition of lifetime 
employment as we know it.  In its most basic form, lifetime employment refers to the practice 
whereby a worker remains with the same employer until the age of retirement.  The list of 
citations provided in Table 1 is by no means exhaustive, but this is not a major setback 
because they are generally variations on the same theme.  Abegglen (1958)’s definition 
emphasizes the lifetime commitment aspect of employment relationships using the analogy of 
membership to family and other intimate relationships.  This behavioral definition is modified 
by adding certain conditions which limit its coverage.  Ohkochi (1972) sets forth the 
condition of “infancy” (kogai).  In this context, new school graduates are considered to be 
infants, and the firm takes on the parental role of raising their workers as if they were their 
own children.  He further explains that lifetime employment does not extend beyond 
mandatory retirement age.  Cole (1979) and Koike (1980) emphasize that employees must be 
hired right after school graduation.  These two conditions are echoed by Ono (1997) who also 
adds that the coverage includes workers regardless of employment status or occupation. 
  To summarize, lifetime employment must fulfill the following two conditions.   8
 
Condition 1 “infancy”:  Immediate employment following school graduation (at time tg). 
Condition 2 “long-term employment”:  Continuous “long-term” employment with the same firm from t0 to t. 
 
where the time units (t) can be expressed in terms of age, calendar year, or in relative terms. 
  Lifetime employment in its purest form must fulfill both conditions simultaneously 
where tg = t0 and t = time of mandatory retirement.  Ono (1989) emphasizes that the condition 
of infancy is the crucial feature which distinguishes lifetime employment from long-term 
employment.  Long-lasting employment relationships may be witnessed in other economies, 
but one which emphasizes infancy may be unique to Japan.   
  If we set t0 = 0 in condition 2, then t is simply equal to tenure, or the duration of 
employment with the same employer.  If total years of work experience is x, then we obtain 
the internal experience rate expressed as: 
 
Years of internal experience  Internal experience rate  =  Years of internal experience + Years of external experience 
 
Tenure   = (t) 
Total years of work experience (x) 
 
Pure lifetime employment requires that the internal experience rate is equal to 100 percent, 
which requires that t = x, or years of external experience = 0; at any given stage in the career, 
the lifetime worker has never been employed by a firm other than the current one.  This 
condition is known as “nativity” (or haenuki).  Taken together with condition 1, native 
workers are “pure” in the sense that their careers have never been adulterated by the work 
cultures of other employers.
6  Any gaps between school graduation and first employment are 
regarded as impurities.  Native workers and lifetime workers are similar expressions, but 
lifetime workers in the strict sense have survived separations until t = mandatory retirement 
age, while native workers may experience separations at any given t.  This is a subtle 
                                                 
6 Ono (1997) sometimes uses the expression “virgin workers” in reference to native workers.   9
distinction which does not affect the estimations since tracking workers until retirement age is 
impossible in practice due to data limitations.  Native workers are taken to be synonymous 
with lifetime workers hereafter. 
  I have thus far outlined the basic premise of lifetime employment which enables us 
to estimate the size of the lifetime workforce with reasonable certainty.  But the question of 
how to estimate the lifetime employment rate remains.  The short answer is that it depends on 
the assumptions, and more practically, on the data available.  A number of simplifications are 
necessary that conventionally involve some approximations of tg, t0 and mandatory retirement 
age.  For example, Hall (1982) considers employment durations lasting longer than twenty 
years (and those that are expected to last more than twenty years) as lifetime jobs in the U.S. 




  In addition to the two broad concepts of lifetime employment, there are various 
measures of labor mobility which are frequently used to assess changes in job stability.  The 
mobility measures I review include tenure distribution, retention rates, number of jobs held, 
separation rates, and accession rates.  The list is not exhaustive, but sufficient for the purpose 
of gaining a multi-dimensional perspective on labor market mobility. 
  The advantage of mobility measures is that (with some exceptions) the data are 
collected and tabulated by the government ministries.  This allows us to make reliable and 
consistent comparisons over time, and in some cases across countries.  Another advantage is 
that (because of the limited access to microdata in Japan) the majority of previous studies 
examine changes in lifetime employment based on these mobility measures.  Their main 
findings and contributions are discussed in the following section.   10
 
3.  Measuring lifetime employment 
(1) Core workforce 
  The labor market segmentation method presupposes that establishment size is one 
crude measure which distinguishes whether an employer is in a position to offer lifetime 
employment or not.  Although the dividing line is debatable, I estimate the core workforce 
following the Ministry of Labor (1993)’s classification.  The core workforce and its share of 
the labor force are thus: 
 
Core workforce   =  Male regular employees in establishments greater than 500 persons 
+ Male regular employees in the government sector 
 
Core workforce 
Core workforce (% share)  =  Employed persons 
 
 
Following the ILO classification, employed persons are defined as persons in the non-
agricultural sector above the age of 15 who worked for at least one hour during the survey 
period.  Regular employees exclude nonstandard workers which consist of part-time, 
temporary and contract workers.  Executives and the self-employed are excluded from the 
sample. 
  Under this method, the core workforce in 2003 is found to be 19.2 percent.  
According to the Ministry of Labor estimates, this proportion declined from 23.4 percent in 
1985 to 21.6 percent in 1991.  Based on these estimates, they suggest that the proportion of 
workers who are believed to be covered by the lifetime employment system has declined over 
time (Ministry of Labor 1993).  My estimation for the year 2003 thus indicates stronger 
support to this effect.   
  However, as previously discussed, there are numerous drawbacks to the 
segmentation method.  The lifetime employment rate estimated under this method should   11
therefore not be taken at face value.  Interpretations should be limited to changes in the 
relative size of the lifetime workforce, and not its absolute size.  The Ministry of Labor offers 
their own explanation as follows: 
 
This is not to argue that the lifetime employment system does not apply to women and workers in small to 
medium size firms.  However, the overall trend suggests that the gradual increase in the number of workers who 
are believed to be not covered by the lifetime employment system resulted in the reduction in the proportion of 
workers who are believed to be covered by it. (Ministry of Labor 1993, p.248) 
 
(2) Standard employment 
  The definition of the core workforce presupposes that nonstandard workers, 
regardless of how long their employment duration or commitment to their employers, are 
excluded from the lifetime employment system.  Tracking standard employment is therefore 
one method to monitor overall trends in lifetime employment. 
  The proportion of standard workers declined from 80.2 percent in 1991 to 69.6 
percent in 2003 (Figure 1).  In absolute terms, the number of standard workers shrank by 2 
million and the number of nonstandard workers expanded by 6.1 million.  The reduction of 
standard workers in both relative and absolute terms suggests that the size of the labor force 
where lifetime employment is believed to apply has contracted over time.
7
  Figure 1 also reveals a sizeable gender difference in nonstandard employment.  In 
2003, the proportion of men in standard employment was 84.5 percent; among women it was 
49.5 percent.  In 1991, these numbers were 91.5 percent and 62.8 percent, respectively.  The 
reduction in standard employment therefore disproportionately affected women relative to 
men.   
  The decline of standard employment in Japan is accelerating at a rate faster than the 
OECD average.  The share of part-time work in total employment in Japan was 24.9 percent 
                                                 
7 The proportion of workers switching from full-time to part-time employment also expanded, from 6.3 percent 
in 1991 to 9.5 percent in 2002 (MHLW statistics).   12
in 2001, the third highest country among the OECD member states (OECD 2003).  Between 
1991 and 2001, the proportion of full-time employment to total employment declined by an 
average of -.4 percent per annum while the corresponding proportion for part-time 
employment grew by .5 percent per annum.  This pattern – the contraction of full-time 
employment and expansion of part-time employment – was observed in only 4 out of the 30 
member states. 
 
(3) Lifetime (or “native”) workers 
 The  Wage Census includes a category of workers called “standard workers” (hyoujun 
rodosha) which refers to those who were employed immediately after school graduation and 
have been continuously employed by the same employer at the time of the survey.  This 
definition therefore fulfills the conditions of infancy and nativity under lifetime employment.  
To avoid confusion with workers hired in standard employment, I refer to these workers as 
lifetime workers hereafter. 
  The lifetime employment rate in age category i at time t is estimated as the 
proportion of lifetime workers to the total number of workers in age category i: 
 
Li LER in age category i   =  Ni
 
 N i   =  Ni
* + Ai + Bi
 
Li  =  Lifetime workers in age category i at time t who started working at t0 
Ni   =  All workers in age category i at time t 
Ni
*  =  Workers in age category i at time t who started working at t0
Ai   =  Workers in age category i at time t who started working after t0
Bi   =  Workers in age category i at time t who left but returned to the labor force between t0 and t 
 
Because the Wage Census does not include retrospective employment data, only Ni is 
available, and Ni
*, Ai and Bi are not directly recorded.  Restricting the denominator to Ni
* 
would yield an alternative measure of lifetime employment where Li = Ni
* at t0, and both Li   13
and Ni
* are monotonically decreasing over i.  This is the case of survival analysis which I take 
up in the following section. 
  The inclusion of Ai and Bi implies that Ni is not necessarily a monotonically 
decreasing function of i.  The estimation results require some caution, mainly that LER will 
always decline for older workers even if Li remains the same.  Consider the case of women.  
As characterized by the so-called M-curve of labor force participation rates over the lifecycle, 
Japanese women enter the labor force in comparable numbers as men, but a sizeable number 
will exit the labor force upon marriage and childbearing, and return to the labor force at later 
stages.  In the case of age 35 < i < age 50, for example, Ni < Ni+1 so LERi+1 < LERi always, 
even if Li = Li+1. 
  Table 2 presents the lifetime employment rate estimated from the Wage Census for 
various years between 1980 to 2000.  The data for 1980 are reprinted from Tachibanaki 
(1984).  His estimations are based on the 1980 Wage Census, so the data are directly 
comparable to my estimations for the time period 1984 to 2000.  I set the upper age limit to 54 
(as did Tachibanaki), and exclude workers 55 and over as their lifetime employment rate may 
be obscured by the higher propensity of workers to switch jobs after retirement age.  LER for 
the age group 50 to 54 is roughly equivalent to the lifetime employment rate that fulfills both 
conditions 1 and 2.  These workers have been continuously employed since school graduation, 
and are close to reaching the retirement age.   
  In general, the proportion of lifetime workers in the labor force increased across all 
age categories during the period 1980 to 2000.  Men are significantly more likely to be 
lifetime workers than are women.  LER declines among older workers, but the rate of decline 
is faster for women.  In 2000, the proportion of lifetime workers remaining in the labor force 
at age 50 to 54 was 23 percent for men versus only 4 percent for women.   14
  I next restrict the sample to workers who are close to reaching retirement.  The mean 
LER for the age group 50 to 54 (men and women combined) increased from 7.4 to 17.9 
percent.  Results for men only in this age group clearly show that education and firm size are 
both positively correlated with the lifetime employment rate.  In the case of university 
graduates in firm size ≥1000, presumably the group of workers who are most likely to be 
covered by lifetime employment, over half are lifetime workers. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
  Chuma (1997) estimates the lifetime employment rate using the Wage Census 
microdata for the time period 1980 to 1994.  His definition of lifetime workers allows for the 
possibility that some workers may have spent an additional year either getting into or out of 
university.  In our terminology, condition tg = t0 required under pure lifetime employment is 
relaxed to be t0 – tg ≤ 1.  This distinction obviously broadens the scope of lifetime workers, 
but the overall trend in the expansion of the lifetime workforce over time (1980 to 1994) 
remains the same, from 38 to 53 percent for male university graduates, and 17 to 33 percent 
for male high school graduates.  He concludes that “with regards to male workers in mid- to 
late-career, lifetime employment has not declined since the mid-1980s, but rather shows sign 
of covering a wider proportion of workers” (Chuma 1997, p.58). 
 
(4)  Lifetime employment in management and executive positions 
  Internal promotion is one of the distinguishing features of the Japanese employment 
system.  The practice refers to the promotion (or upgrading) of incumbents from lower ranks 
within the organization.  The candidates for internal promotion therefore include both native 
and non-native workers.  The questions that motivate our research are whether nativity   15
improves promotion rates, and if so, how has this practice changed over time?  Previous 
research has consistently shown that nativity is positively correlated with promotion.  For 
example, Ariga et al (2000) use the distinction regulars versus irregulars (comparable to 
natives versus non-natives), and finds that the regulars are significantly more likely to be 
internally promoted than are irregulars.  I discuss further evidence below. 
  Comparative studies have found that nativity is indeed crucial in promotion decisions 
in the Japanese firm.  Ono and Shiraishi (1993) for example, report findings from a survey of 
managers conducted in U.S. firms and Japanese firms based in the U.S. which asked the 
question:  “Is nativity important in the promotion of workers into management positions?”  In 
the U.S. firms, 65 percent of upper management and 57 percent of middle management 
responded “not important at all.”  In the Japanese firms, this response rate was less than 2 
percent for both management levels. 
  One way to examine the persistence of nativity in internal promotions is to look at 
the lifetime employment rate at different ranks of the organization.  In this tradition, Ono 
(1997) uses microdata from the Wage Census and estimates the lifetime employment rate for 
male managers using a method comparable to the one discussed previously (LER).  He finds 
that the lifetime employment rate increased across all levels of management (from low-level 
management to division chief) during the years 1980 to 1990.  Moreover, lifetime (or native) 
workers tend to be younger than “non-native” workers within the same level of management, 
implying that the former have faster promotion rates.  Ono (1997) further extends his analysis 
to the sample of upper level managers and executives using data from the Diamond Directory 
of Executives for the years 1975 and 1984.  He shows that the lifetime employment rate   16
increased during these years, from 25 to 37 percent among executives, and from 52 to 69 
percent among non-executives (above section chief but below managing directors).
8
  In a similar vein, I analyze the lifetime employment rate among executives using 
microdata from 1993 and 1997.  The 1993 data come from the Survey of Company 
Executives’ Careers conducted by the Japan Trade Union Confederation.  The sample size is 
2,246 with mean age of 57.7, and consists of executives among the listed companies plus 
unlisted insurance companies which were randomly sampled from the Toyokeizai Directory of 
Executives 1994.
9  Executives include chairman, vice-chairman, president, and managing 
directors.
10  The 1997 data come from the Diamond Directory of Executives 1998.  The 
sample consists of only presidents among the listed companies, with sample size 2,231 and 
mean age of 62.2.  In Table 3, the column “internal experience” is the ratio of tenure divided 
by total years of work experience, expressed in percentages.  For lifetime workers, this ratio 
equals 100 percent.  Internal experience greater than 50 percent indicates that the executive 
has more internal experience than external experience.
11
  The results for 1993 indicate that internal promotion remains the norm for executives 
in Japanese corporations.  The majority (63 percent) of executives are lifetime workers, with 
mean tenure of 27 years, and mean internal experience of 80 percent.  In a more recent study, 
                                                 
8 Ono (1997)’s estimation results are reported by industry for the 22 industries covered in the survey.  I estimated 
the weighted average by using the frequency distributions of workers by industry reported in the Enterprise 
Census for the years 1975 and 1984. 
9 In the 1993 data, 8,000 executives were randomly selected from the Toyokeizai Directory of Executives 1994 
consisting of 40,800 executives representing 2,157 companies.  The sample is therefore the result of cluster 
sampling where the sampling unit is the company.  This leaves the possibility of homogeneity among 
observations obtained within the same company.  However, using the available information on industry, firm 
size and capital, I identified 1,884 unique companies in the data.  The maximum number of observations from 
any one company was five.  I therefore assume that homogeneity within sampling units did not significantly bias 
the results.  It should further be noted that there is only one president per company.  The estimation results for 
presidents in Table 3 are therefore free of any bias that may be associated with cluster sampling. 
10 Following Wailerdsak and Suehiro (2004), I exclude auditors because they do not have direct input in 
management. 
11 The current sample excludes executives who may have graduated from school after joining the firm, such as 
those who may have completed their education through evening school.  For these workers, tg > t0 which would 
violate the condition of “pure” lifetime employment.  I estimated the lifetime employment rate for the sample 
that includes these executives.  The results were almost identical (and are not reported here) suggesting that the 
lifetime employment rate is not sensitive to the exclusion of evening school graduates.  See Ono (1997) for a 
similar estimation of lifetime employment that separates workers into the sample of tg = t0 and tg ≥ t0.   17
Wailerdsak and Suehiro (2004) use the same database (Toyokeizai Directory of Executives) 
and estimate the proportion of lifetime executives to be 71 percent in 2001.  The lifetime 
employment rate among executives therefore increased from 1993 to 2001. 
  The results also vary across ranks.  On average, presidents have the shortest tenure, 
smallest percentage of lifetime workers, and smallest ratio of internal experience.  Looking 
only at the group of presidents, vice-presidents and managing directors, we observe a general 
pattern where the proportion of lifetime workers and the ratio of internal experience decline in 
the opposite direction from rank.  Hence, the likelihood of internal promotion is smaller at the 
higher ranks of executive positions.
12   
  Breaking down the sample by firm size categories reveals the significance of firm 
size effects on promotion.  Internal promotion is more common among the larger firms (here 
defined as firm size ≥ 1,000); two-thirds of all executives are lifetime workers, with internal 
experience ratio greater than 80 percent.  The firm size effect is also significant among the 
sample of presidents only.  These results may partly reflect the employment practice where 
top executives are transferred from large firms to smaller firms (Noda 1995). 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
  The results for 1997 for the sample of presidents show a modest increase in the 
proportion of lifetime workers, mean tenure, and mean internal experience.
13  A breakdown 
by firm size categories shows an identical pattern to the one found in 1993, where lifetime 
employment rates are considerably higher among larger firms. 
                                                 
12 Ito and Teruyama (1995) examine the tenure distribution among executives using the same dataset.  They 
explain that the short tenure of presidents is attributable to the higher likelihood of externally hired executives 
that are appointed to presidents. 
 
13 Increase in mean tenure may be partly attributable to the rise in the mean age of presidents which increased 
from 60.9 to 62.2 over these years.     18
  In my final analysis, I examine the sample of executives in the top 100 firms as 
measured by their firm size and capital.  These measures allow us to make a rough 
comparison of the Japan data to empirical estimations obtained from Cappelli and Hamori 
(2004) in the U.S.  Their sample consists of top executives among the Fortune 100 companies 
for the years 1980 and 2001.  While the Fortune 100 companies are selected on the basis of 
revenue in the previous year, I am unable to do this because revenue data are not included in 
my dataset.  As a rough approximation, I selected the top 100 companies by rank order of 
their firm size and capital.
14  In the 1993 data, firm size was recorded in six categories.  I took 
the largest category of firm size ≥ 10,000 which had a frequency distribution of 10 percent.  
So the “top 100 firms by firm size” in 1993 should be interpreted as the top 10 percent by 
firm size. 
  The 1993 results for the sample of all executives reveal a remarkably higher ratio of 
lifetime workers – 78 percent among the largest firms (by firm size), and 85 percent among 
the top 100 firms (by capital).  These executives also had considerably longer tenure of about 
31 years in both categories, with a mean internal experience ratio greater than 90 percent.  In 
comparison, Cappelli and Hamori (2004)’s estimates of lifetime workers among the sample of 
Fortune 100’s top executives were 53 percent in 1980, and 45 percent in 2001.  Mean tenure 
for all executives was 20.6 years in 1980, and 15.2 years in 2001.
15  Clearly, lifetime 
employment among executives is more pervasive in Japan than in the U.S. 
                                                 
14 In 1997, firm size is recorded as its actual number, so I was able to select the top 100 firms.  These were firms 
greater than 9,150 employees, with a mean of 21,830.  In the Cappelli and Hamori (2004) sample, the means 
were 104,437 in 1980, and 136,614 in 2000.  So the average Fortune 100 firm is considerably larger than the 
average “top 100” firm in Japan.  Incidentally, there was only one firm with firm size greater than 100,000 in the 
1997 data, which was NTT with firm size 182,482.  The second largest firm was East Japan Railway with firm 
size 80,020. 
15 Cappelli and Hamori (2004)’s sample includes a large number of missing data in executives’ career histories.  
The proportion of lifetime workers among the sample with complete career histories was 60 percent in 1980, and 
48 percent in 2001.  Mean tenure should be interpreted with some caution because of the differences in mean age 
between executives in Japan and the U.S.  Among Fortune 100 executives, mean age was 56.0 in 1980, and 51.9 
in 2001, which is somewhat younger than the mean age of 57.7 among Japanese executives in 1993.   19
  The 1997 data consist of presidents only, so the results are not directly comparable to 
the U.S. study.
16  But the results again reveal the higher proportion of lifetime workers among 
the largest firms in Japan.  Among the top 100 firms by capital, 80 percent of presidents are 
lifetime workers, with an average of 90 percent internal experience. 
 
(5) Survival rates 
  The survival rate is the probability of surviving beyond time t, or the probability of 
not experiencing a failure prior to t.  In the current context, failure refers to first job separation, 
and the survival rate is the probability of remaining with the same job until t.  The Kaplan-
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where nj is the number of workers who have survived to tj and monotonically decreasing, and 
dj is the number of workers separated from their jobs at tj.  Alternatively, the survival function 
may be expressed S(t) = ∏(1 – λj) where λj is the hazard rate of experiencing a job separation 
at tj.  At tj = 0, dj = 0, and S(t) = 1.  The starting condition is therefore that all workers are 
eligible for lifetime employment at the time of entry into their first jobs. 
  In this section, I present results from an analysis of first job separations using  cross-
sectional microdata from the 1995 Social Stratification and Mobility Survey.  The analysis is 
necessarily crude, as my primary objective is to estimate survival probabilities of certain 
categories of workers.
17  Still this is a useful exercise to gain a better understanding of the 
                                                 
16 Estimations for the sample of presidents only in the 1993 data are not available due to the small sample size of 
presidents in the top 100 firms. 
17 A more technical analysis has been undertaken by Yamaguchi (1992, 2004) but for male employees only.  His 
study explores different functional forms of the hazard function in predicting the timing of first job separations.   20
dynamics of lifetime employment, and to gain another perspective on the size of the lifetime 
workforce.  The sample size is 1,983 consisting of men and women between the ages of 20 
and 70 in the non-agricultural sector, who entered the labor force after 1945.  The sample 
excludes the self-employed.  Duration of employment until first job separation is defined as 
the difference between the starting age of the first job and the age of first job separation, for 
those who experienced a separation, or the age at the time of the survey for censored cases.  
Following Yamaguchi (1992), I treat employment duration greater than 30 as censored, 
because separations occurring after more than 30 years of employment may be due to 
retirement, and the data do not distinguish retirement from other types of separations.  In the 
current sample, the starting age of employment (t0) is not necessarily equal to the age of 
school graduation (tg) for all respondents.  Hence, the analysis fulfills condition 2 of lifetime 
employment, but does not fulfill condition 1.  I conducted separate analysis by using the 
sample that fulfills this requirement t0 = tg (or Chuma [1997]’s condition where t0 – tg ≤ 1).  
The results were not significantly different and are not reported here. 
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  I employ Cox proportional hazard models to predict the event of first job 
separations.
18  The results are generally consistent with expectations (Table 4).  University 
graduates (versus less than university) and workers in large firms and government have higher 
survival probabilities (indicated by their lower hazard rates), while part-time and female 
workers have lower survival probabilities.  Cohort variables indicating the year of labor force 
entry show that the hazard rate has remained stable over the last 40 years. 
                                                 
18 Parametric estimations using Weibull, Gompertz and log-normal distributions yielded similar results.   21
  The second column of Table 4 includes the interaction effect for female and marital 
status.  Marriage affects the hazard rate asymmetrically for men and women.  Married men 
have a lower hazard rate than do single men, while the reverse holds true for women.  Married 
women are twice as likely to experience job separation than are married men (= e
.131+.547).  
The results are generally consistent with the exit pattern of married women from the Japanese 
labor force.
19
  Kaplan-Meier survival probabilities are presented in Table 5 and Figure 2.
20  On 
average, the proportion of workers who survived 30 years of employment with the same 
employer is 20 percent.  We again confirm the significance of gender, education and firm size 
effects, with survival probabilities estimated in the expected direction.  The results clearly 
show the high survival probabilities in large firms and the government sector.  About a 
quarter of workers in firms ≥1000 and half in government are still employed there after 30 
years.  Male workers in firms ≥1000 and in the government sector have considerably higher 
survival probabilities.  Separate estimates for these workers are found to be 49 percent and 65 
percent, respectively. 
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(6) Tenure distribution 
  A frequently used measure of long-term employment relationships is the mean years 
of tenure.  According to the Wage Census data (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
                                                 
19 Marriage is not coded as a time-varying variable in the current analysis, so the results reported here show 
correlations and not causations. 
20 Inclusion of part-time workers minimally affects the survival rates, and only at the shorter employment 
durations, because most part-time workers drop out before 10 years, i.e. it does not affect the survival probability 
of longer durations. 
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[MHLW]), mean tenure in Japan gradually increased over the period 1980 to 2003, from 10.8 
to 13.5 years for men, and from 6.1 to 9 years for women.  The one caveat, however, is that 
average tenure does not account for population aging.  MHLW statistics show that the mean 
age of the labor force increased from 36.8 to 40.3 years over the same period.  Mandatory 
retirement age, which was conventionally set at 55 years, was also raised in response to 
population aging.  91 percent of firms now set the mandatory retirement age at 60 years 
compared to 55 percent in 1985 and 60 percent in 1990 (MHLW statistics 2005).  The long-
term effect of the aging labor force may therefore offset the modest increase in mean tenure.  
Evidence to this effect is documented in OECD (1997) who showed that changes in average 
tenure between 1985 and 1995 were statistically insignificant in Japan (and other OECD 
countries) after controlling for changes in age and gender composition of employment. 
  The aging effect becomes evident when we examine mean tenure by age groups.  
This is shown in Figure 3 for male employees for the period 1977 to 2003 (data for women 
[available from 1990 to 2003] show a similar pattern across age groups, and are not shown 
here).  In general, the data show that mean tenure increased among the older workers, and less 
so among the younger workers.  The increase was greatest in the age group 55 to 59 who 
presumably benefited most from the raising of the mandatory retirement age over this period. 
  Figure 3 is divided into two time periods, somewhat arbitrarily, by the vertical line 
which marks the year 1990.  In the pre-1990 period, mean tenure increased across all age 
groups, except in the 30 to 34 age group.  In the post-1990 period, it increased only among the 
older age groups (50 and over).  This pattern thus implies that the rise in mean tenure since 
the 1990s was driven up by older workers. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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  An alternative view of employment stability is to examine the share of workers under 
certain categories of tenure.  Table 6 shows the tenure distribution of the labor force estimated 
from the 2000 Wage Census data.  The data clearly show that employment is more stable 
among the larger firms.  Mean tenure is longer, and the proportion of workers belonging to 
longer tenure categories becomes greater among larger firms. 
  Men have considerably longer tenure than do women.  As the column “men/women 
ratio” indicates, women are overrepresented in the less than 1 year tenure category, and 
underrepresented in the longer tenure categories.  The gender gap in tenure distribution is 
greater among the larger firms, implying that employment in large firms disproportionately 
favors men over women with regards to employment stability. 
  Following Hall (1982), I also report the distribution in the tenure 20+ category for 
workers aged 35 and over, since a large portion of workers under 35 could not possibly have 
long tenure.  This simple definition fulfills condition 2 of lifetime employment (but not 
condition 1), and is sometimes taken as an approximation of long-term or lifetime jobs (e.g. 
Farber 1997).  By this account, 37 percent (of workers aged 35 and over) would be counted as 
being employed in lifetime jobs.  This proportion is highest for men employed in large firms 
(59 percent).  However, this approximation does not account for workers who are currently 
working in jobs which may ultimately last twenty years or longer (Hall 1982).  I address this 
shortcoming in the following section. 
  
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
  The advantage of using tenure distribution is that it is one of the few measures that 
allows for a consistent comparison across countries.  This is demonstrated in Auer and Cazes 
(2000) who used ILO and Eurostat data from 1998 to estimate tenure distribution for various   24
countries (Table 4).  They use the Wage Census data in Japan, so the results are directly 
comparable to those reported in Table 6.  Aging effects not withstanding, the proportion of 
workers with tenure of 10 years and over in Japan was 42.9 years in 1995 (not shown here), 
43.2 percent in 1998 (Table 7), and 45.5 percent in 2000 (Table 6), thus indicating a modest 
expansion in this category.  The proportion with tenure of 20 years and over was 21.4 percent 
in 1995, so there was no change in this category over the 5 year period. 
  The data show that Japan, with average tenure of 11.6 years, is above the mean for 
the countries shown here, but not necessarily the country with the longest tenure.  However, 
when broken down by gender, average tenure becomes 13.1 years for men, second only to 
Greece.  In contrast, average tenure for women is 8.2 years, which falls below the mean for 
these countries.  The ratio of men’s average tenure to women’s is 1.6 in Japan, which is the 
largest gender differential among these countries.  The data further reinforces the gender 
stratified view of the Japanese labor market where men benefit from lifetime employment 
more than do women. 
  In general, low job mobility is characterized by small percentage of workers in short-
lasting jobs, and large percentage of workers in long-term jobs (OECD 1986).  In this regard, 
Japan has the lowest job mobility among the OECD states, with the lowest share of workers 
with tenure under 1 year, and the highest share of workers with tenure over 20 years (Figure 4, 
1995 data).  At the other extreme is the U.S., a high mobility country with large share of 
workers in short-term jobs, and small share in long-term jobs.  Earlier data from OECD 
(1986) show a similar pattern with Japan recording the longest mean tenure, lowest share with 
tenure less than one year, and highest share with tenure over 20 years.  Japan’s standing as the 
low mobility country has thus persisted since the 1980s. 
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(7) Retention rates 
  The retention rate is the estimated probability that a worker will remain with the 
same employer for a certain duration, typically 5, 10, or 15 years.  Following Hall (1982), 
retention rates in Japan have been estimated by Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) and Kato 
(2001).  Their main findings are reported in Table 8. 
  Kato (2001) examines 10 year retention rates among the civilian non-institutional 
population (which excludes self-employed and not in the labor force) using data from 1977 to 
1997.  He separates his analysis to the time period 1977 to 1987, and 1987 to 1997 to examine 
employment stability in the pre-bubble versus the post-bubble periods of the 1980s.  Table 8 
highlights the commonly observed pattern where retention rates become higher among the 
older cohorts.  Workers are more likely to shop around for jobs during the early years of their 
career, but eventually settle down into “permanent” jobs at later stages.   
  Overall, Kato finds that retention rates for these two time periods remained relatively 
stable, and concludes that there is “little evidence for serious erosion of the practice of 
lifetime employment” (p.494).  For example, as shown in Table 8, retention rates in the age 
groups 30 and above were about 80 percent for the period 1977 to 1987, and these rates 
changed little for the period 1987 to 1997.  In other words, about four out of five employees 
(with tenure greater than 5 years) retained the same job ten years later during the turbulent 
years of the Japanese economy.  But the data do indicate setbacks in some areas.  Kato 
explains that “the burden of downsizing during the economic slowdown in the 1990s appears 
to have fallen disproportionately on young employees and middle age employees with short 
tenure, in particular middle age female employees with short tenure” (p.495).     26
  Following Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), Kato also estimates 15 year retention rates 
in the U.S. and Japan for male employees.  Results show that retention rates in Japan are 
significantly higher than in the U.S. in all age-tenure categories.
21  According to these 
estimates, male employees over the age of 25 with five or more years of tenure have over a 70 
percent probability of remaining with the same employer 15 years later in Japan, but this 
probability falls to 47 percent in the U.S.  The results also show that retention rates remained 
remarkably stable in both countries over the last 35 years.
22   
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  In 1997, the OECD estimated 5 year retention rates among their member states 
(OECD 1997).  The results show that Japan, at 64.2 percent, had the highest 5 year retention 
rate in the world (followed by Germany [60.7 percent] and Switzerland [55.2 percent]).  The 
results therefore further support the stability of employment relationships in Japan. 
 
(8) Number of jobs held 
  Another measure of job mobility is the number of jobs held by the average worker.  
Originally proposed by Hall (1982), and later replicated by Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) and 
others, the hypothetical number of jobs by a worker of given age can be estimated as: 
 
Cumulative number of 
jobs held by age group (i)  =  Cumulative number of jobs held by age group (i – 1) 
+ {Accession rate in age group (i) × Number of year intervals in age group (i)}
 
                                                 
21 Koike (1977) uses 1962 data and reports that the tenure of 15 years and over is more common in the U.S. than 
in Japan.  However, Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) argue that this is misleading because lifetime employment 
became widespread only after the mid-1950s. 
22 For a more elaborate estimation of retention rates in the U.S., see Diebold, Neumark and Polsky (1997) and 
Neumark, Polsky and Hansen (1999).   27
where the accession rate refers to the number of new hires divided by the number of 
employed persons.  Accession rates are discussed in further detail below.  This is a 
straightforward estimation method which can be conducted for any year using published 
government data.  However, because the data are cross-sectional, it is interpreted as the 
hypothetical number of jobs the average worker would expect to have, if year and cohort 
effects were not present (Flath 2000).   
  Estimation results for male workers are reported in Table 9a.  Results for 1977 
indicate that the average male worker would have experienced approximately five jobs by the 
time he reaches the age of 64.  In the U.S., this number was eleven jobs (for male workers in 
1978, estimated by Hashimoto and Raisian 1985).  Comparable estimates are also available 
from Britain, but for both men and women.  According to Gregg and Wadsworth (1995)’s 
estimations, the average British worker would have experienced 10.7 jobs over the working 
life (by the age of 64) in 1989, and 8.4 in 1993.  Although not shown here, my estimates for 
both men and women were 8.6 jobs in 1991 and 7.6 jobs in 1995.  These results suggest that 
job mobility has remained lower in Japan compared to the U.S. and Britain.
23
  In Japan, the cumulative number of jobs increases to about eight in 1991 and also in 
2003.  While these numbers point to an overall increase in job mobility compared to 1977, the 
data also indicate that this increase was largely affected by the mobility of younger workers 
(and to some extent older workers in age group 55 to 64).  The proportion of young workers 
starting new jobs increased considerably in the youngest age category of 16 to 19 which 
drives up the predictions.  In 1977, the average male worker would have experienced .8 jobs 
by the age of 19 versus 2.5 jobs in the 1990s and 2003.  Stated another way, he would have 
experienced 16 percent of the eventual number of jobs by the time he reaches 19 in 1977, and 
over 30 percent in the 1990s and 2003.  Hence, if we exclude the age 16 to 19 category from 
                                                 
23 Earlier data from 1966 using the same estimation method show that the cumulative number of jobs for male 
worker at the age of 64 was 4.2 in Japan, and 10.2 in the U.S. (data cited in Flath [2000]).   28
Table 9a, the results would indicate only a modest increase in the number of jobs held, from 
about four in 1977, to about five in the 1990s and 2003. 
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  Table 9b reports the actual number of jobs held in Japan and the U.S.  The results in 
the U.S. are direct responses to the question, “For how many employers have you ever 
worked full time?” taken from the 1998 General Social Survey.  The results in Japan were 
estimated from detailed work history data available from the 1995 Social Stratification and 
Mobility Survey.  The last two rows of Table 9b also report the percentage of workers who 
have never changed jobs, or workers who have worked for only one employer.  I report the 
percentages for the age group 50 to 54 as a rough approximation of workers who are close to 
reaching retirement.
24  Both samples consist of respondents who are currently employed in 
part-time or full-time positions, and exclude the self-employed.
25
  The results further highlight the stability of employment relationships in Japan 
relative to the U.S.  With the exception of men in the 20 to 24 age group, the number of full-
time jobs held by the U.S. worker is roughly double the number held by the Japanese worker 
at any given age level.  The proportion of workers who have never changed jobs (in the age 
group 50 to 54) is 19.6 percent in Japan versus 5.0 percent in the U.S.  In the case of Japan, I 
also report the same proportion who may have been in either full-time or part-time jobs.  This 
proportion remains the same for men, but increases by 4.7 percent for women.  In other words, 
                                                 
24 One caveat is that both samples include workers who started working at any age.  This was not a significant 
setback in Japan.  In separate analysis, I confirm that 98 percent of workers were employed before the age of 25.  
I was unable to confirm this in the GSS data because the age of labor market entry is not recorded. 
25 This condition eliminates workers who may have been employed previously, but are not currently working.  
This is a required condition since we want to estimate the proportion of workers who have survived job 
separations until reaching retirement age.   29
4.7 percent of women (in the age group 50 to 54) have been employed in part-time positions 
“for life” versus zero percent for men.  
 
(9) Separation rates 
  The separation rate is defined as the total number of separations divided by the total 
number of employed persons.
26  It is a general measure that captures the outflow of workers.  
The total separation rate changed very little in Japan over the time period 1991 to 2003 (Table 
10).  However, the total rate masks the considerable variation in separations across age groups 
(Figure 5), a topic addressed below.  The data show that women are more likely to be 
separated from their jobs than are men.  The separation rate remained stable for regular 
workers, but increased modestly for part-time workers.  The separation rate for firm size ≥ 
1000 shows that the flow of workers out of large firms also increased during this period.  
Separation rates for men only in this category show a similar increase, indicating a pattern of 
increasing separations from the core.
27
  Table 10 also shows the separation rates by sex and reasons for separations.  Here, 
the reported numbers represent the job separations for each category as the percentage of the 
total number of separations (and not the total number of employed persons).  “Transfers” is 
shown in parenthesis because this is a sub-category of separations due to “employer’s 
discretion.”  Likewise, “marriage, childbearing and homecare” is a sub-category under 
“personal reasons.”  The sum of all categories minus these two sub-categories equals 100 
percent.  MHLW’s classification of involuntary separation includes expiration of contract, 
                                                 
26 Separation rates are sometimes taken to be synonymous with turnover rates (e.g. Blinder and Krueger 1996), 
but they are distinct concepts.  Turnover rate involves both accessions and separations.  We may refer to 
turnover rates as separation rates, if we assume that accessions equal separations. 
27 Firm size categories reported in the Employment Trends Survey (MHLW) are not consistent with those 
reported in the Labor Force Survey (MIC statistics).  Firm size category ≥ 500, for example, is not available in 
the Employment Trends Survey.   30
employer’s discretion (including transfers), and mandatory retirement.  Voluntary separations 
are separations for personal reasons. 
  In general, voluntary and involuntary separations move in opposite directions – 
voluntary separations are pro-cyclical, and involuntary separations are counter-cyclical.  
Table 10 shows a trendline of increasing involuntary separations and decreasing voluntary 
separations, a pattern that suggests that separations were affected by the economic downturn 
of the 1990s.  The most conspicuous trend is the increasing proportion of separations due to 
the employer’s discretion.  Overall, this rate has more than doubled for both men and women.  
Whether transfers should be counted as involuntary or not depends on the nature of the 
transfer, but their exclusion results in a similar increasing pattern over these years.  
Separations due to mandatory retirement also increased during the same period.  This upward 
trend is expected to continue in the foreseeable future against the backdrop of the aging 
workforce. 
  The most noticeable distinction between the sexes is that women are significantly 
more likely to separate for marriage, childbearing and homecare.  Although this proportion 
has declined, 10 percent of all separations among women are still due to their having to take 
on family obligations.  In contrast, this proportion is virtually zero for men. 
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  Although not shown here, involuntary separation rates as the percentage of the total 
number of employed persons also indicates an upward trend, from 2.6 in 1988 to 4.2 in 2003 
(MHLW statistics).  For men, these rates increased from 2.5 to 4.1, and for women, from 2.4   31
to 3.8 over these years.
28  Despite the small proportion, these estimates suggest that 
involuntary separations have risen over time, both in absolute and in relative terms. 
  Figure 5 shows separation rates by age categories for men only (data for women 
were roughly similar to men’s and are not reported here).  We observe the general lifecycle 
pattern of job mobility – high separation rates among the young and the old, and the low 
separation rates in the middle categories.  Separation rates among the age groups 25 to 59 
remained virtually flat during this period.  Separation rates for the age groups 60 and over 
show some fluctuations reflecting an increasing pattern of job mobility among workers in 
post-retirement. 
  The greatest change was recorded by the youngest age category of 19 and under, 
from 27.4 percent in 1991 to 42.2 percent in 2003 (and from 22.9 percent to 47.8 percent for 
women).  This upward trend is consistent with the so-called 7-5-3 phenomenon which was 
coined in the 1990s to depict the high rate of job separations among the youth.  The 
expression describes the emerging pattern where approximately 70 percent of middle school 
graduates, 50 percent of high school graduates, and 30 percent of college graduates are 
separated from their jobs within three years. 
  An international comparison of separation rates is available from OECD for various 
years.  In the 1980s, separation rates in Japan were lowest among the countries surveyed 
while they were highest in the U.S. (OECD 1986).  More recent data show separations due to 
both layoffs (= involuntary separations) and quits (= voluntary separations) as the proportion 
of total employment (OECD 1997).  The separation rates for Japan under this category were 
1.9 in the 1980s, and 2.4 in the 1990s.  In both periods, these numbers were far below the 
average recorded in the EU (2.7 and 4.4), and in the U.S. (5.1 and 4.0).  Moreover, separation 
                                                 
28 1988 estimates for men and women are taken from Rebick (2001).  Total number of employed persons does 
not include workers in construction.  The Employment Trends Survey did not include construction workers prior 
to 1991.  To account for this change in sampling, Rebick excludes construction workers for the sample of 
workers after 1991.  I calculated the involuntary separation rates for 2003 using the same estimation method as 
Rebick.   32
rates due to layoffs in Japan were the lowest among all OECD member states in both periods.  
Involuntary job separations may be on the rise in Japan, but they are still far less common 
than they are in other countries. 
 
(10) Accession rates 
  The accession rate measures the flow of workers into employment, and is defined as 
the number of new hires divided by the number of employed persons.  The total accession rate 
shows some fluctuations during the period 1991 to 2003 with an overall modest decrease.   
Women have higher accession rates than do men.  Taken together with their higher separation 
rates (Table 10), the data further suggest a higher incidence of labor mobility among women 
relative to men.  Accession rates declined by over 3 percentage points for regular workers, but 
only by .2 percentage points for part-time workers.  Data for firm size ≥ 1000 – for both the 
total and for men only – show that accession to the core is now less probable than before. 
  The denominator for accession and separation rates are the same, and this allows us 
to look at the difference between the inflow and outflow of workers.  In Table 11, the minus 
sign shows a “mobility deficit” where separations were greater than accessions.  With the 
exception of 1991, the results indicate an overall mobility deficit during the 1994 to 2003 
period.  The mobility deficit for regular workers and for workers in large firms accompanied 
by an overall mobility surplus among part-time workers suggests that the core workforce is 
shrinking. 
  Finally, I examine accession rates at the entry level for newly graduating students.  I 
use the expression “new” school graduates to distinguish those who have just graduated from 
those graduates who are already employed.  The data indicate a diminishing flow of new 
recruits into the core.  Accession rates for new university graduates by firm size show a 
conspicuous trendline – decreasing probability of entry into the large firms (≥1000)   33
accompanied by an increasing probability of entry into small firms.  Accession rates into 
“freeter” status (which includes part-time and temporary workers) also clearly indicate that 
both high school and university graduates are now significantly more likely to be hired into 
nonstandard employment.   
  In sum, we observe a declining flow of new recruits into the core, and an increasing 
flow of new graduates into nonstandard employment.  The expansion of nonstandard 
employment among the youth population in the 1990s invariably led to their higher job 
separations (Figure 5).  The declining share of standard workers in the labor force (Figure 1) 
is to a large extent attributable to the increasing flow of young workers into nonstandard 
employment.   
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4.  Summary and Discussion 
  So how big is lifetime employment in Japan?  While lifetime employment is often 
touted as one of the main pillars of the Japanese employment system, in practice, it applies 
only to a small proportion of the labor force.  My estimations based on various methods point 
to roughly 20 percent:  (i) The ex-ante measure of the core workforce, which assumes that 
lifetime employment coverage is limited to male standard workers in large firms (≥500) and 
in government, is 19 percent; (ii) The proportion of lifetime workers defined as those in the 
age group 50 to 54 who have never left their employers since school graduation, is 18 percent; 
(iii) The probability of surviving job separations for 30 years is 20 percent; and (iv) The 
proportion of workers in the age group 50 to 54 who have never experienced job separations 
is 22 percent.   34
  Yet, the lifetime employment rate varies considerably by gender, firm size, and 
education level.  My analysis solidly confirms the generalized view that female workers do 
not benefit from the lifetime employment system, while male workers in large firms (and in 
government) are most likely to be covered by it.  At its extreme, the proportion of lifetime 
workers among male university graduates in large firms is 55 percent, and the 30 year 
survival probability of male workers in government is 65 percent. 
  How unique is lifetime employment in Japan?  If lifetime employment is taken as a 
generalized practice of long-term employment, then the practice is more pervasive in Japan 
than in other countries.  Job mobility in Japan remains one of the lowest among the OECD 
member countries, as characterized by the following features:  (i) the highest proportion of 
workers with tenure longer than 20 years; (ii) lowest proportion of workers with tenure less 
than one year; (iii) highest 5 year retention rate; (iv) lowest separation rate; and (v) lowest 
involuntary separation rate.  At the opposite end of the scale lies the U.S., characterized by 
high job mobility.  By any measure, job mobility is much higher in the U.S. than in Japan.  
Comparison of job mobility between these two countries should thus be understood as a 
comparison of two extremes. 
  And, how has lifetime employment changed over time?  I present a summary table of 
the various estimations in Table 12.  Changes in lifetime employment are shown under the 
column “lifetime employment” where the (+) sign indicates support for it and the (–) sign 
indicates its decline.  The results are mixed.  Overall, the decline in the core workforce, 
standard employment, and full-time employment (as the share of total employment) suggests 
a decline in lifetime employment.  On the other hand, the proportion of lifetime workers, and 
the probability of surviving job separations show an upward trend or no change.  The two are 
not necessarily conflicting findings but require some elaboration. 
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TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE 
 
  Much of the disagreement regarding changes in lifetime employment stems from 
confounding or not disaggregating the inflow, outflow and the stock of workers.  One 
interpretation is that although the population of workers who are ex-ante covered by lifetime 
employment may be shrinking, the likelihood of job separations has remained stable for those 
who are already in the system.  Consider the analogy between the labor force and the bathtub 
where the water flowing into the tub represents the flow of workers into the core, water 
flowing out is the flow of workers out of the core, and the water level in the tub is the 
employment level (or the stock) of the core workforce.  In this analogy, the water level 
remains the same or decreases because:  (i) There is little water being eliminated from the tub; 
and, (ii) Preserving the current water level requires choking off the flow of water into the tub.  
The mobility measures add support to this effect.  In the 1990s, new graduates were 
significantly less likely to enter the labor force as standard workers than in previous periods.  
This led to two outcomes.  First, standard employment declined relative to nonstandard 
employment, which led to an overall reduction of the core workforce.  And second, the 
expansion of the nonstandard workforce among younger workers resulted in their higher job 
mobility (as characterized by their lower retention rates and higher separation rates).  In 
contrast, job mobility among older workers remained virtually unchanged during the 1990s 
(with the exception of the post-retirement age group). 
  Taken together, we observe a pattern of bifurcation between good jobs and bad jobs, 
or more specifically, young persons entering bad jobs, and older persons remaining in good 
jobs.  This has resulted in the erosion of employment stability among young workers and its 
resilience among older workers.  The ongoing debate concerns whether this outcome is 
attributable to changes in the supply side or the demand side.  The consensus is shifting   36
towards the latter.  A modest increase in involuntary job separations accompanied by a 
decrease in voluntary separations suggests that job mobility was affected by the economic 
conditions of the 1990s.  Outside employment prospects for those who were already in the 
core were not favorable, so the core workers held on to their jobs.  The firms responded by 
avoiding dismissals to the fullest extent possible, and instead cut back on recruitment of new 
graduates.  Genda (2001) surmises that the adverse conditions of youth employment in the 
1990s were the consequence of overly emphasizing the employment protection of middle- to 
older workers.  The economic downturn triggered a hiring freeze where employers prioritized 
the protection of their core workers at the expense of new hires.  The statistics show that 
many of the new graduates became freeters involuntarily; they prefer standard employment, 
but were unable to do so because of unfavorable demand-side conditions.
29   
  Meanwhile, survey results from both workers and employers indicate strong support 
for the lifetime employment system.  In fact, the support base seems to be increasing.  A 
worker survey conducted in 2004 shows that 78 percent of workers are in favor of lifetime 
employment, an increase of 5.7 percent from the first survey conducted in 1999 (JILPT 
2005b).
30  Older workers are more likely to support the system, presumably because they are 
more likely to benefit from it, but the majority of the younger workers also show support for it 
(64.2 percent of males and 66.4 percent of females in their 20s).  On the employer’s side, 
survey results from 1999 show that 60.6 percent of personnel managers intend to “maintain 
lifetime employment as much as possible,” an increase from the 46.8 percent reported in 
                                                 
29 The youth unemployment rate (age group 15 to 24) climbed from 4.3 to 9.6 percent between 1990 and 2001, 
while the corresponding numbers for the age group 45 to 54 were 1.2 and 3.5 percent (MIC statistics, various 
years).  Citing MHLW statistics, Genda (2001) explains that the proportion of “freeters” who actively sought but 
could not find full-time employment increased from 10 to 26 percent between 1989 and 1997, while the 
proportion who had no intention to work full-time decreased from 22 to 14 percent during the same period.  He 
also shows that firms with higher proportion of older workers were less likely to hire new graduates during the 
1990s.  For further description of the freeter and jobless youth issues, see JILPT (2005a). 
30 Survey conducted by the Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training (JILPT).  Response rate in support for 
lifetime employment is the proportion of workers who responded that lifetime employment is “good” or “better 
than the alternative.”   37
1997.
31  These survey results are strong counterevidence to the anecdotal view that lifetime 
employment is a thing of the past.  Workers – both the young and the old – desire 
employment security, and employers still feel obliged to preserve the system. 
  From an incentive perspective, it can be argued that lifetime employment will 
maintain its resilience as long as it acts as an incentive device.  Emphasis on nativity in 
promotion decisions among managers and executives shows no signs of decline; if anything, 
it is now more important than before.  As long as this promotion practice persists, loyalty and 
commitment will remain the norm, and there will be no incentive to seek outside employment 
opportunities. 
  The incentive among top executives is also aligned to protect the employment of 
their workers.  The 1993 survey of executives (cited previously) asked the question, “What is 
your most important mission as a company executive?”  Noda (1995) ranks the possible 
responses, then predicts their effects on executive compensation.  The top response was, “to 
protect the employment and lifestyle of workers” (response rate 41 percent).  Moreover, this 
response was linked to higher executive compensation.  In contrast, “to improve returns to 
shareholders” was a distant eighth (response rate 6 percent), and this response had no effect 
on compensation.  The findings highlight the conventional wisdom that Japanese firms are not 
run in the interest of shareholders but in the interest of protecting their human resources 
(Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005; Milgrom and Roberts 1992).  The priorities and incentives 
among executives are aligned to maintain the lifetime employment system. 
  An ingrained feature of native workers is that they have the longest tenure in their 
age group.  In theory, this implies that native workers have accumulated the maximum 
attainable level of firm-specific skills among their co-workers.  As long as the returns to 
tenure remain positive, this relationship predicts that native workers will always earn higher 
                                                 
31 Survey on Changes in the Japanese Personnel System conducted by the Japan Productivity Center for Socio-
Economic Development, cited in MHLW (2001).   38
wages than non-natives, ceteris paribus.  Empirical evidence from the Wage Census data 
shows that the tenure effect, or more generally the seniority effect on wages, declined 
throughout the 1980s (Clark and Ogawa 1992; Genda 1998).
32  The incentive to remain with 
the firm may therefore be diminishing, which would predict a downward trend in lifetime 
employment in the long-run.  However, my analysis (also using the Wage Census data) shows 
that the proportion of lifetime workers increased during the same period under which the 
seniority effect on wages declined.  Moreover, the possibility of losing returns to seniority and 
the fear that their skills may not be transferable to other firms remain two of the top reasons 
that workers do not change jobs in Japan (Moriguchi and Ono, forthcoming; Ono and Rebick 
2003).  The incentives underlying the Japanese employment system may not be as 
straightforward as can be predicted under conventional economic intuition. 
  This paper has examined the various concepts and measurements involved in 
estimating the lifetime employment rate.  I have documented various measures regarding the 
size of the lifetime workforce, its uniqueness in the international context, and its changes over 
time.  The estimations depend critically on the definitions and underlying assumptions.  They 
also depend on the time period, demographic group, and labor market sector.  I intentionally 
avoided segmenting the labor force into finer units as this would exponentially broaden the 
scope of my analysis.  Lifetime employment rates vary across industries, union versus 
nonunion settings, occupations, and by other employer and employee attributes, but I reserve 
these questions for future research. 
 
 
                                                 
32 Genda (1998) also shows that the tenure effect on promotion rates into management positions was lower in 
1992 compared to 1980.   39
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Table 1  Concepts and measurements of lifetime employment 
 
Source Concept  /  Definition  Estimates 
     
Labor market segmentation   
Taira (1962)  (R)eview of the postwar Japanese labor markets shows 
that the appropriateness of the “permanent” status is 
limited to the permanent, unionized employees of the 
high-wage, large firms, who can be identified with the 
permanent regulars in the firms employing 500 or 
more regular workers. (p.167) 
 
No more than a fifth 
of all wage-earners in 
Japanese 
manufacturing. 
Dore (1973)  Employment institutions characteristic of the 
‘Japanese system’ are found in (a) government 
employment, (b) firms with more than 500 employees, 
(c) a fair but not easily estimated proportion of 
enterprises with one to five hundred employees, 
especially in the white collar industries – and in those 
manufacturing establishments, perhaps about a quarter 
of the total, which have trade unions. (pp.304-305) 
 
Half of the total 
number of 
employees, or about 
one-third of all those 
gainfully occupied in 
the Japanese 
economy. 
Cole (1979)  (In response to Dore [1973]) 
If one accepts, as seems reasonable, that females are 
almost totally excluded from the experience of 
permanent employment, then one ought to use the total 
labor force (and not just males) as the denominator to 
determine the scope of permanent employment. (p.61) 
 
32 percent of all 
employees, or 
20 percent of those 
gainfully employed. 
Abegglen and Stalk (1985)  It has been suggested that some 30 percent of the 
Japanese labor force is covered by the system of 
permanent employment, but it appears that this 
estimate derives from the fact that 30 percent of the 
labor force is unionized.  The system is by no means 
coterminous with unionization. (p.201) 
 
N.A. 
Ministry of Labor (1993)  We estimate the proportion of employees covered by 
lifetime employment to be:  (1) male regular workers 
in the non-agricultural sectors employed in firms with 
at least 500 regular workers; (2) male regular workers 
employed in the government sector; divided by (3) 
total number of workers employed in the non-
agricultural sectors. (p.248) 
 
23.4 percent in 1985 
21.6 percent in 1991 
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Table 1  Concepts and measurements of lifetime employment (continued) 
 
Source Concept  /  Definition  Estimates 
    
Ex-post method    
Abegglen (1958)  At whatever level of organization in the Japanese 
factory, the worker commits himself on entrance to the 
company for the remainder of his working career.  The 
company will not discharge him even temporarily 
except in the most extreme circumstances.  He will not 
quit the company for industrial employment 
elsewhere.  He is a member of the company in way 
resembling that in which persons are members of 
families, fraternal organizations, and other intimate 
and personal groups in the United States. (p.11) 
 
N.A. 
Ohkochi (1972)  Permanent employment does not simply imply a long-
term employment relationship.  Firms hire workers 
and “raise them from their infancy” (kogai) to become 
employees who will continue to work with the firm 
until mandatory retirement age.  It means that, whether 
they be shop-floor workers or clerical workers, they 
will remain with the firm for a long duration, and 
continue to work within the firm. (p.178) 
 
N.A. 
Cole (1979)  Permanent employment refers to the practice whereby 
an employee enters a company after school graduation, 
receives in-company training, and remains an 
employee of the same company until the retirement 
age of fifty-five. (p.11) 
 
N.A. 
Koike (1980)  Workers become employed right after their graduation 
from school with a particular company.  The employer 
will not lay off his workers if possible even in the 
course of depression. The employee in turn will not 
quit his job at this company but tends to continue 
working there until he reaches his retirement age. 
 
N.A. 
Ono (1997)  (In response to Ohkochi [1972]) 
There are three essential elements to the concept of 
lifetime employment.  First, workers must enter the 
firm immediately following school graduation – no 
gaps are allowed between graduation and firm entry.  
Second, workers are hired with the implicit 
understanding that their employment will be secured 
until mandatory retirement.  And third, lifetime 
employment applies to all workers regardless of 
employment status or occupation. 
 
(see text) 
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Table 2  Proportion of lifetime workers to the total number of employed persons (percentages) 
 
 1980
a 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Men       
30 to 34  33.1 34.3 34.6 33.6  33.5 
35 to 39  18.6 27.7 30.2 30.3  31.2 
40 to 44  14.9 21.1 25.6 27.6  29.1 
45 to 49  11.0 14.3 20.2 23.8  27.0 
50 to 54  9.8 9.8 12.9 17.4  22.8 
       
Women       
30 to 34  21.7 18.5 20.6 22.6  27.4 
35 to 39  6.3 7.9 12.3 14.4  17.7 
40 to 44  2.9 3.9 6.0 8.2  12.0 
45 to 49  2.0 2.0 3.2 4.3  8.0 
50 to 54  1.3 1.8 1.8 2.3  4.3 
       
Men and women ( age 50 to 54)  - 7.4 9.7 13.2  17.9 
       
Men only (age 50 to 54)       
High school graduates  -  11.4 11.5 17.6  19.1 
University graduates  -  28.7 37.0 38.4  41.3 
       
Firm size 10 to 99  -  2.7 4.2 4.5  6.6 
Firm size 100 to 999  -  7.1 11.2 16.5  21.6 
Firm size ≥ 1000  -  20.8 24.3 31.0  40.5 
        
University graduates in firm 
size ≥ 1000  34.1 41.4 49.5 50.8  55.2 
[SOURCE:  Author’s estimations using Wage Census, various years] 
a 1980 data reprinted from Tachibanaki (1984)   44
 
Table 3  Lifetime employment among executives 
 




















Average  63.1 27.2  79.6     -    -    -  
       
Chairman + Vice-chairman  41.9  31.5  73.4     -    -    -  
President 32.1  22.4  57.4    34.7   24.4   64.1 
Vice-president 59.8  30.7  78.4     -    -    -  
Managing directors  64.6  27.0  80.5     -    -    -  
        
By firm size (all executives)        
   Small firms (<1000)  49.3  24.2  71.6     -    -    -  
   Large firms (≥1000) 68.6  28.4  82.9     -    -    -  
       
By firm size (presidents only)       
   Small firms (<1000)  22.2  19.1 50.9    24.8   21.9    58.1 
   Large firms (≥1000) 42.3  25.8  64.1    46.4   27.3   71.1 
       
Top 100 firms  (all executives)    (presidents only) 
   By firm size 
a 78.2 31.1  90.5    72.4   34.1   88.0 
   By capital  84.5  30.6  91.2     80.2   35.7   90.0 
[SOURCE:  Author’s estimations using Survey of Company Executives’ Careers (1993) and Diamond Directory 
of Executives (1998)] 
a 1993 sample is top 10 percent by firm size.  See text for explanation.  45
 
Table 4  Cox proportional hazard models predicting first job separation 
 
      (1)          (2)    
  Hazard ratios     S.E.    Hazard ratios     S.E. 
University  graduate  -0.276 ** (0.090)   -0.261  ** (0.090)
Firm  size             
  100 to 999  -0.165 *  (0.066)   -0.165  *  (0.066)
  ≥  1000  -0.374 ** (0.069)   -0.362  ** (0.069)
  Government  -1.047 **  (0.119)   -1.036  **  (0.119)
Part-time  0.251 * (0.101)   0.244  * (0.101)
Female 0.606 **  (0.060)   0.131    (0.162)
Married 0.035   (0.094)   -0.238  *  (0.122)
Female*married         0.547  **  (0.172)
Cohort             
  LF entry 1955 to 64  0.082   (0.091)   0.072    (0.091)
  LF entry 1965 to 74  0.058   (0.089)   0.038    (0.090)
  LF entry 1975 to 84  0.080   (0.096)   0.056    (0.096)
  LF entry 1985 to 94  0.189   (0.115)   0.180    (0.115)
Model χ
2 342.16      352.36    
Df                    11                           12      
N               1,983                         1,983        
* p<.05, ** p<.01 
Baseline categories are less than university, firm size < 100, and labor force entry 1946 to 1954.  46
 
 
Table 5  Survival probability estimations 
 
    10 years    20 years    30 years  
      
Total 0.32  0.24  0.20   
 
Men 0.49  0.38  0.34   
Women 0.17  0.10  0.07   
 
Less than university  0.28  0.19  0.16  
University 0.54  0.49  0.43   
 
Firm size 
  < 100  0.22  0.13  0.10  
  100 to 999  0.28  0.18  0.17  
  ≥ 1000  0.40  0.32  0.26  
  Government  0.67  0.58  0.51  
 
Men only 
  Less than university  0.44  0.32  0.28  
  University  0.61  0.55  0.49  
 
  Firm size ≥ 1000  0.63  0.57  0.49  
  Government  0.77  0.72  0.65  
  
Table 6  Tenure distribution by gender and firm size (2000, percentages) 
      Total  Men  Women  Men/Women 
        
Tenure (years)  All firms  12.0 13.3 8.0  1.66
  10 to 99  9.9 10.7 8.3  1.29
  100 to 999  11.4 12.7 8.4  1.51
  ≥1000  15.2 16.8 10.1 1.66
        
Less than 1 year  All firms  7.3 6.2 9.9  0.62
  10 to 99  9.7 8.9 11.5  0.77
  100 to 999  7.0 6.0 9.2  0.65
  ≥1000  4.7 3.3 8.8 0.38
         
10 years and over  All firms  45.5 51.0 32.7  1.56
  10 to 99  37.5 40.6 30.8  1.32
  100 to 999  43.3 49.1 30.8  1.59
  ≥1000  58.1 64.5 38.5 1.67
         
20 years and over  All firms  21.5 25.9 11.0  2.35
  10 to 99  15.2 17.6 9.9  1.77
  100 to 999  19.3 23.8 9.6  2.47
  ≥1000  31.9 37.5 14.9 2.51
         
(Age 35 and over)         
20 years and over  All firms  36.5 41.3 22.2  1.86
  10 to 99  24.3 27.2 17.3  1.57
  100 to 999  34.3 39.4 20.2  1.95
  ≥1000  55.0 59.0 36.4 1.62
                 
[SOURCE:  Author’s estimations using Wage Census]   48



















Japan 11.6 13.1  8.2 1.60 7.6 43.2  21.4
Belgium  11.6 12.2 10.8 1.13 11.6 46.5 19.4
Denmark 8.5 9.2  7.7 1.19 25.1 33.5  11.4
Finland  10.6 11.1 10.0 1.11 17.6 42.5 17.3
France  11.3 11.7 10.8 1.08 15.0 45.0 18.7
Germany 10.4 11.3  9.2 1.23 16.1 38.3  17.0
Greece  13.2 13.8 12.2 1.13 12.6 51.2 13.3
Ireland 10.1 11.6  7.7 1.51 17.8 37.7  11.9
Italy  12.1 12.7 11.0 1.15 8.5 49.2 19.5
Luxembourg 11.2 12.3  9.2 1.34 11.4 44.2 16.4
Netherlands 9.4 10.6  7.8 1.36 16.3 36.5  11.9
Portugal  11.6 11.2 12.1 0.93 13.4 43.1 20.8
Spain 10.0 10.9  8.5 1.28 35.0 39.8  16.5
Sweden  11.9 12.0 11.8 1.02 14.8 47.8 17.0
U.K. 8.2 9.2  7.1 1.30 19.6 32.3  13.3
U.S.  6.6 7.1 6.1 1.16 26.0 25.8 9.0
Average 10.5 11.2  9.4 1.19 16.1 41.0  15.9
a 1995 data. 
[SOURCE:  Auer and Cazes 2000; OECD 1997]   49
Table 8  Retention rates in Japan and the U.S. (percentages) 
 
   All     Men    Women  Age Tenure 
  1977 - 87  1987 - 97    1977 - 87  1987 - 97    1977 - 87  1987 - 97 
                
10 year retention rates (Japan)            
15  to  19  Less  than  5   32.9  31.2  54.2 45.5  14.4  17.0
20  to  24  Less  than  5   41.3  36.8  64.1 55.4  19.3  18.7
  5+   46.4  40.5  62.9 57.6  18.1  18.3
25  to  29  Less  than  5   55.0  50.4  65.4 64.2  35.4  28.1
  5+   68.0  60.5  73.6 69.9  48.1  40.2
30  to  34  Less  than  5   56.2  47.1  62.3 56.2  48.6  37.6
  5+   80.0  77.4  81.6 80.0  72.4  70.1
35  to  39  Less  than  5   57.9  45.7  58.6 54.3  57.3  40.7
  5+   83.4  81.5  86.2 84.1  73.4  73.4
40  to  44  Less  than  5   60.4  48.2  66.9 60.6  56.0  42.7
  5+    80.0  79.3    84.5 84.6    67.7  66.5
                
15 year retention rates           
Men only      Japan     U.S.       
      1962 - 77
a 1982 - 97    1963 - 78
a 1983 - 98       
15 to 19  Less than 5    36.4  40.0   5.6 4.6      
20 to 24  Less than 5    45.1  51.1   13.0 13.9      
  5+   65.3  55.2  30.0 28.5      
25 to 34  Less than 5    42.7  52.2   22.2 20.1      
  5+   73.0  73.6  47.3 48.1      
35 to 39
 b Less  than  5   37.7  46.7  24.4 22.1      
  5+   75.9  78.4  54.5 52.1      
[SOURCE:  Reprinted from Kato 2001] 
a Reprinted from Hashimoto and Raisian 1985. 
b 35 to 44 age category in the U.S.   50
 
Table 9a  Cumulative number of new jobs (male workers) 
 
  Accession rates (%)    Cumulative number of new jobs 
 1977 
a 1991 1995 2003    1977
 a 1991 1995 2003 
16 to 19               19            61.8            62.6            60.1                0.8              2.5              2.5              2.4 
20 to 24               26            31.6            29.0            32.1                2.1              4.1              4.0              4.0 
25 to 29               13            13.9            11.1            13.4                2.7              4.7              4.5              4.7 
30 to 34                 8            10.9              7.5            10.2                3.1              5.3              4.9              5.2 
35 to 39                 7              7.1              6.0              8.3                3.5              5.6              5.2              5.6 
40 to 54                 5              6.8              6.0              6.8                4.2              6.7              6.1              6.6 
55 to 64                 7            11.1              9.8              9.0                 4.9              7.8              7.1              7.5 
[SOURCE:  Author’s estimations using Employment Trends Survey, various years] 




Table 9b  Actual number of jobs held in Japan and the U.S. 
 
  Japan (1995)    U.S. (1998) 
 Total  Men  Women    Total  Men  Women 
Number of full-time jobs held           
   20 to 24  1.3 1.4 1.2  2.6 2.2 3.1
   25 to 34  1.6 1.7 1.5  4.4 4.8 4.0
   35 to 44  1.9 1.9 1.8  5.1 5.8 4.5
   45 to 54  1.9 2.1 1.7  5.3 5.6 5.0
  
% who have never changed jobs 
(age group 50 to 54 only)          
Full-time jobs  19.6 26.3 11.8  5.0 4.3 5.6
Full-time and part-time jobs  21.7 26.3 16.5   - - -
[SOURCE:  Author’s estimations using Social Stratification and Mobility Survey 1995 (Japan) and General 
Social Survey 1998 (U.S.)]   51
 
Table 10  Separation rates (percentages) 
 
    1991  1994 1997 2000 2003 
Separation rates        
Total  15.2 13.8 15.2  16.0   16.1  
  Men  12.0  11.4  12.9  13.2   13.1  
  Women  20.2  17.6  18.9  20.2   20.8  
  Regular workers  13.8  12.3 13.6 13.5    13.3   
  Part-time workers  24.7  23.9 25.2 27.6   27.8  
  Firm size ≥1000  12.5 11.4 11.0 14.5    15.4   
  Firm size ≥1000 (men only)  8.0  7.4  7.4  10.3   10.3  
    
Separation rates by reason for separation    
Total    
  Expiration of contract  8.2  8.4  10.7  10.5   10.5  
  Employer’s discretion  4.5  7.5  7.4  9.3   9.8  
    Transfers  (1.8) (3.1) (3.1) (2.9)  (3.2) 
  Mandatory retirement  3.3  5.5  5.8  5.2   5.9  
  Personal reasons  82.1  76.1 74.2 73.3   72.2  
    Marriage, childbearing and homecare (7.0) (7.8) (6.6) (5.3)  (5.1) 
  Death, illness  2.1  2.6  1.8  1.7   1.8  
    
Men    
  Expiration of contract  10.3  9.4  13.1  10.6   11.1  
  Employer’s discretion  6.2  9.2  10.3  12.2   13.8  
    Transfers  (3.1) (5.0) (5.3) (5.1)  (5.5) 
  Mandatory retirement  5.4  8.2  8.3  7.7   8.5  
  Personal reasons  75.9  70.3 66.0 67.5   64.5  
    Marriage, childbearing and homecare (0.1) (0.2) (0.4) (0.3)  (0.3) 
  Death, illness  2.3  2.9  2.4  2.0   2.1  
    
Women    
  Expiration of contract  6.1  7.5  8.0  10.5   9.9  
  Employer’s discretion  2.9  5.6  4.2  6.3   5.9  
    Transfers  (0.5) (1.3) (0.6) (0.8)  (0.9) 
  Mandatory retirement  1.3  2.7  3.0  2.7   3.3  
  Personal reasons  87.9  81.9 83.6 79.2   79.5  
    Marriage, childbearing and homecare (13.5) (15.6) (13.7) (10.4) (9.9) 
  Death, illness  1.9  2.3  1.2  1.3   1.5  
[SOURCE:  Employment Trends Survey, MHLW, various years]   52
 
Table 11  Accession rates 
 
  1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 
Accession rates      
Total 16.7 12.9 14.4 14.7  14.7
Men 13.4 10.9 11.8 12.1  11.7
Women 21.8 16.2 18.5 18.7  19.4
Regular workers  14.8 11.7 12.4 11.8  11.5
Part-time workers  34.5 27.1 32.4 38.8  34.3
Firm size ≥1000 15.1 9.8 10.3 12.6  13.8
Firm size ≥1000 (men only)  10.2 6.6 6.8 8.5  8.8
   
Accession minus separation       
Total 1.5 -0.9 -0.8 -1.3  -1.4
Men 1.4 -0.5 -1.1 -1.1  -1.4
Women 1.6 -1.4 -0.4 -1.5  -1.4
Regular workers  1.0 -0.6 -1.2 -1.7  -1.8
Part-time workers  9.8 3.2 7.2 11.2  6.5
Firm size ≥1000 2.6 -1.6 -0.7 -1.9  -1.6
Firm size ≥1000 (men only)  2.2 -0.8 -0.6 -1.8  -1.5
   
Accession rates for new university graduates       
Firm size 5 to 99  9.2 18.2 25.6 28.0  27.1
Firm size 100 to 999  34.5 41.9 42.9 43.2  35.4
Firm size ≥1000 52.5 37.7 28.7 25.7  32.5
   
Accession rates to Freeter status 
a) b)    
New high school graduates  13.1 22.1 25.1 35.4  38.6
New university graduates  7.4 18.9 20.6 32.3  33.0
[SOURCE:  Employment Trends Survey, MHLW.  Accession rates for university graduates and 
Freeter status from School Basic Survey, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology] 
a) 1990 data. 
b) 1995 data.   53
Table 12  Changes in lifetime employment – Summary table 
 
 Years  Change  Lifetime 
employment Source 
Core workers  85 to 91  (-)  (-)  MoL 
  91 to 03  (-)  (-)  MHLW; mine 
Standard employment  95 to 03  (-)  (-)  MIC 
Nonstandard employment  95 to 03  (+)  (-)  MIC 
Full-time  91 to 01  (-)  (-)  OECD (2003) 
Part-time  91 to 01  (+)  (-)  OECD (2003) 
        
Lifetime (native) workers        
  Men  80 to 94  (+)  (+)  Chuma (1997) 
  Men  80 to 90  (+)  (+)  Tachibanaki (1984); mine 
  Men  90 to 00  (+)  (+)  Mine 
  Women  80 to 90  (+)  (+)  Tachibanaki (1984); mine 
  Women  90 to 00  (+)  (+)  Mine 
  Managers (men)  80 to 90  (+)  (+)  Ono (1997) 
  Upper-level management  75 to 84  (+)  (+)  Ono (1997) 
  Executives  75 to 84  (+)  (+)  Ono (1997) 
  Executives  93 to 04  (+)  (+)  Wailerdsak & Suehiro (2004); mine 
        
Survival rates
 a 55 to 94  no change no change  Mine 
        
Tenure        
  Mean tenure  80 to 03  (+)  (+)  MHLW 
  10 years and over  91 to 95  no change no change  OECD (1997) 
  95 to 98  (+)  (+)  Auer & Cazes (2001) 
  20 years and over  95 to 00  no change no change  OECD (1997); mine 
        
Retention rates        
  10 year retention  87 to 97  no change no change  Kato (2001) 
  15 year retention (men)  77 to 97  no change no change  Hashimoto & Raisian (1985); Kato (2001) 
        
Cumulative number of jobs        
  Men  77 to 91  (+)  (-)  Hashimoto & Raisian (1985); mine 
  Men  91 to 03  no change no change  Mine 
        
Separation rates        
  Regular workers  91 to 03  no change no change  MHLW 
  Firm size ≥1000 91  to  03  (+)  (-)  MHLW 
  Involuntary  88 to 03  (+)  (-)  MHLW, Rebick (2001); mine 
        
Accession rates        
  Regular workers  91 to 03  (-)  (-)  MHLW 
  Firm size ≥1000 91  to  03  (-)  (-)  MHLW 
  Into “freeter” status  91 to 03  (+)  (-)  MEXT 
        
Accession minus separation        
  Regular workers  91 to 03  (-)  (-)  MHLW 
  Firm size ≥1000 91  to  03  (-)  (-)  MHLW 
MoL: Ministry of Labor; MIC: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; MHLW: Ministry of Health, 
Labor and Welfare; MEXT: Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. 



























[SOURCE:  Labor Force Survey, MIC] 
 
Figure 1  Standard employment 

















































































Figure 2c Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by firm size







































































[SOURCE:  Wage Census, MHLW, various years] 
* Data for age groups less than 30 not available prior to 1990. 
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[SOURCE:  OECD] 
 
























[SOURCE:  Employment Trends Survey, MHLW] 
Figure 5  Separation rates by age group (men only) 
 